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Abstract: In March 2018, another presidential election took place in the Russian 
Federation. For the fourth time Vladimir Putin won the election by a large majority of 
votes. Alexei Navalny – an opposition candidate who had been preparing his election 
campaign since the end of 2016 – was not allowed to stand in the election. Regardless 
of his elimination from the election, Navalny remained an active member of Russian 
political life before and after the election; he carried out a boycott of the election, 
and organized post-election protests. Without a doubt, despite the ban on running in 
the election, Navalny was one of the main figures in the electoral process. Thus, the 
aim of this article is a detailed analysis of Navalny’s preparations for the campaign 
– the authors focused not only on the candidate’s opposition activity, but also on his 
unique measures and methods of running a campaign (Internet, social media, crowd-
funding). The article examines the campaign preparations, as well as the reasons for 
the rejection of Navalny’s registration as an election candidate, social support index, 
relationships with other candidates and the change of strategy after the Central Elec-
tion Commission’s decision. The analysis is based on Russian law, Central Election 
Commission’s decisions, opinion poll results and information from the Russian and 
international media.
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On May 7, 2018, seven weeks after the election, the inauguration of Vladimir Putin’s fourth term as president took place. Two days 
earlier, more than ten Russian cities organized demonstrations under the 
slogan “He’s not our tsar.”1 The main originator and organizer of the 
1 The biggest demonstrations took place in Moscow and Saint Petersburg. The 
cities’ authorities did not give permission to carry out protests, hence both events 
were illegal. Despite that, at least several thousand people took part in the protests. 
Among the slogans, apart from the main one of “He’s not our tsar” (regarding Putin’s 
18 years of presidency) there appeared “Russia without corruption,” “Cast forth the 
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protests was the informal leader of the non-parliamentary opposition, 
Alexei Navalny, who had planned to run in the presidential election. The 
whole process of preparation for the election had been carefully planned 
by Navalny himself and his volunteering staff. They took care of details 
such as campaign funds, efficient collection of signatures supporting his 
candidacy and a PR campaign in the mass media. But on December 25, 
2017, the Russian Central Electoral Commission rejected Navalny’s reg-
istration, due to his lack of passive voting rights. In the end, despite an 
appeal against the Commission’s decision in court and its interpretation 
of a constitutional provision favorable to Navalny, he was not allowed to 
stand in the election. In addition to unofficially taking part in the election 
campaign, he was an active member of Russian political life before and 
after the election. He also carried out a boycott of the election and orga-
nized post-election protests. It is without a doubt that Navalny was one of 
the key figures in the electoral process, despite not being allowed to run. 
Hence the aim of this article is to analyze Navalny’s campaign prepara-
tions – not only because of the fact that he had a real chance of becoming 
the only opposition presidential candidate with a chance of winning,2 but 
also because of the means and methods of running his campaign (the use 
of the Internet, crowdfunding, etc.). The authors of the article analyzed the 
campaign preparations and the reasons for denying Navalny registration, 
tsar,” “We are not slaves,” “Putin retire.” During the demonstration, confrontations 
between the protesters and the police, including mass arrests took place – over 700 
people in Moscow and about 1,600 in the whole country were arrested (data ОВД-
Инфо – independent projects devoted to political oppression in Russia; Литой, 2018). 
In Saint Petersburg, when protesters went out onto the main street – the Nevsky Pros-
pect – they were arrested by police within a few minutes. The main organizer of the 
protests, Alexei Navalny was also arrested (and sentenced to 30 days in jail). Protests 
took place in other cities as well, e.g., Chelyabinsk, Yakutsk, Krasnodar, Voronezh 
and many others.
2 Formally, 8 candidates representing different political parties and initiatives ran 
in the election. However, the majority of them originate from parties that, for years, 
have been operating in the framework of the Russian political system and do not have 
any influence upon it. It is rare for the representatives of these parties to engage in 
oppositional actions against the authorities or criticize those in power. Only Ksenia 
Sobchak declared that her candidacy would guarantee the presence of opposition in 
the election, especially after denying Navalny the possibility of standing in the elec-
tion. However, as a result of the lack of political experience and opposition support, 
as well as infinitesimal support from society and doubts about her independence (there 
were rumors that the candidate was convenient for Vladimir Putin), Ksenia Sobchak’s 
candidacy was not taken seriously.
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his social support index, relationships with other candidates and change 
of strategy after the Electoral Commission’s decision. The analysis has 
been carried out based on research on Russian law, the Central Electoral 
Commission’s decisions, results of public opinion polls and information 
in Russian and international media.
Russian election ordinance
In Russia, the procedure of carrying out presidential elections is regu-
lated by the following acts: the Constitution of Russia, Federal Law “On 
Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens of the 
Russian Federation to Participate in a Referendum,” Federal Law “On the 
Election of the President of the Russian Federation,” and selected laws 
from other acts (Процедура	выборов). Elections are general, equal, di-
rect and are carried out by secret voting. Suffrage has been guaranteed to 
everyone, regardless of their sex, race, nationality, parentage, possession 
and social status, affiliation to public associations or other circumstanc-
es. The only limitation to active voting is age – voters must be at least 
18 years of age. Additionally, voting rights and rights to be elected are not 
granted to people who are incapacitated by court decision or in prison at 
the time of the election (Федеральный	закон	„О	выборах…”).
A Russian citizen who is at least 35 years of age and has been living on 
the country’s territory continually for 10 years can be elected President of 
the Russian Federation. In addition, the same person cannot be President 
of the Russian Federation for longer than 2 consecutive terms (Konstytucja	
Federacji	Rosyjskiej, art. 80). No other limitations are stated in the Con-
stitution. Other conditions have been included in the Law “On the Elec-
tion of the President of the Russian Federation” of 2014. According to the 
amended paragraph 5.2, article 3, a passive voting right is denied to people 
sentenced to prison for major crimes, extremist crimes, and for administra-
tive crimes if the sentence is being served during the election period. An 
offender loses their passive voting right not only for the duration of the 
sentence, but for a further 10 to 15 years (depending on the seriousness of 
the crime) from the date of expungement or discontinuation of the sentence. 
After the introduction of these amendments to the election ordinance their 
constitutionality was questioned, and it has been assumed that the main ad-
dressee of the law is the opposition candidate – Alexei Navalny. This matter 
will be closely analyzed in the following sections.
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The regulations regarding the pre-election campaign can be found in 
the above mentioned acts. According to Article 50 of the Federal Law 
“On the Election of the President of the Russian Federation” the cam-
paign starts on the day the candidate obtains approval for their candidacy 
from the Central Electoral Commission, and ends one day before the ac-
tual voting. Separate regulations have been set out for campaigns using 
traditional media – television, radio, press. In that case, the campaign 
starts 28 days before the polling day, and ends also one day before the 
election. It is forbidden to campaign on the polling day and the day before 
it (Федеральный	закон	„О	выборах…”).
Regulations regarding the presidential election procedure in Russia 
do not seem to significantly differ from those applied in Western demo-
cratic countries. However, the ability to use them instrumentally led to the 
elimination of the only opposition candidate from the election. Although 
according to the Russian law he could not be considered an official presi-
dential candidate and his actions did not fall under the definition of an 
election campaign given by the law, his presence in the public sphere 
influenced not only the election process, but also the perception of it by 
Russian citizens and election observers.
Elections without Alexei Navalny  
– the Russian Central Electoral Commission’s decision
Three months before the election, on December 18, 2017, a decision 
of the Federation Council calling the presidential election was published, 
which is considered the beginning of the election campaign. Navalny had 
been preparing to stand for months prior to the announcement of the elec-
tion. Even before the official beginning of the campaign, he had almost 80 
groups of staff all around Russia, ready to work (Fig. 1). He also accumu-
lated the required amount of 500 signatures under his candidacy.
However, on December 25, 2017, the Central Electoral Commission 
refused Navalny’s registration as a candidate for the president of Russia. 
The reason was his lack of the passive voting right – in 2013, he received 
a 5 year suspended prison sentence for embezzlement in Kirowles. The 
first sentence was overruled and another examination of the case was or-
dered by the European Court of Human Rights, which recognized the fact 
that Navalny had not been given access to a fair trial. However, the appeal 
ruling also convicted him. Therefore, according to the law on the election 
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of a president, amended in 2014, Navalny cannot run in elections until 
2028 (a 5 year sentence plus a 10 year ban on standing in elections after 
the end of the sentence) (Strzelecki, 2017).
After the Central Electoral Commission’s decision was issued, Na-
valny argued that the law taking away the passive voting right from per-
sons who are convicted, but do not serve the sentence in prison, is against 
the Russian Constitution (which only forbids the incapacitated and those 
sentenced to prison from standing in elections). Nonetheless, the Consti-
tutional Court to which Navalny appealed against the Central Electoral 
Commission’s decision, refused to consider the matter and, at the same 
time, deemed the law limiting the passive voting right constitutional 
(Определение	Конституционного	Суда). As a consequence, Navalny 
lost his right to stand in the presidential elections in 2018 and 2024. Nev-
ertheless, he did not abandon his campaign, which had already started, 
and decided to use the structures prepared and resources accumulated to 
carry out a boycott of the election and build support among Russian soci-
ety for the coming years.
Navalny’s “Non-campaign”
Navalny’s unofficial campaign had begun over a year before the elec-
tion. He expressed his will to run in the Russian presidential election in 
December 2016. In February 2017, in Petersburg, the first headquarters 
Figure 1. A map created by Navalny showing locations of his staff (as of early 
December 2017)
Source: Навальный20!8, https://2018.navalny.com/, 4.12.2017.
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of his presidential campaign was opened, and the opening of dozens more 
campaign offices was announced in the following months. The aim was to 
build as large a network of people as possible who would not only help in 
running the campaign but would also put their signature under Navalny’s 
candidacy.3 By the end of 2017, when it was finally certain that the op-
position candidate would not stand in the election, 84 groups of staff in 
almost all regions of Russia had been created. They managed to accumu-
late 700,000 declarations from people who put their signature under Na-
valny’s candidacy. Additionally, almost 200,000 volunteers offered their 
help in running the potential campaign (Год	кампании).
Figure 2. Official website of Navalny as a Russian presidential candidate
Source: Навальный20!8, https://2018.navalny.com/, 4.12.2017.
The candidate’s professional website was also created for the purpose 
of the campaign, as well as accounts on social media and other channels of 
online communication (Facebook, Twitter, ВКонтакте, Одноклассники). 
Cohesive and modern visual identification, daily updates and the interac-
tive form of communication (comments, discussions, etc.) helped Navalny 
3 In accordance with Article 36 of the Law “On the Election of the President 
of the Russian Federation,” if Navalny had been allowed to stand in the election, 
he would have to get at least 300,000 signatures supporting his candidacy, includ-
ing at least 7,500 in each region of the Russian Federation (Федеральный закон 
„О выборах”). If the candidate is put forward by a political party, he is required to 
gain only 100,000 signatures. Candidates proposed by a party which has representa-
tives in the State Duma are an exception – they do not need any signatures under 
their candidacy.
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gain support, especially among young voters.4 The opposition politician, 
as part of his campaign, visited many Russian cities and towns, organized 
meetings with voters, continued his spectacular anti-corruption initiative 
and organized protests.5 These actions showed measurable effects – in 
June 2017, more than half of Russians (55%) knew who Navalny was.6 
This, of course, could not guarantee him electoral victory, since he only 
got 1–2% in the opinion polls. However, in a country where for the past 
18 years power has been in the hands of one person, and there are no 
independent parties in the Parliament, gradually building support for an 
opposition candidate appears to be a good strategy.
During the preparation for the election, funding had also been taken 
care of. At the time of collecting signatures under Navalny’s candidacy, 
a fund-raiser for the campaign was launched as well. Donations could 
be made through the website in various ways – direct transfers from the 
biggest Russian banks, account contributions, PayPal payments, card-
2card transfers and even Bitcoins. An online shop was opened, with Na-
valny’s campaign merchandise expressing support for his candidacy for 
the president of Russia (t-shirts, bags, pins, stickers, mugs, etc.). The aim 
of the store was not only to accumulate funds for the campaign, but also 
to spread awareness of the candidate.
In total, 368 million rubles (about 6 million US dollars – exchange 
rate as of May 2018) had been collected. Financial reports were shown on 
the candidate’s website every month, and in April 2018 detailed financial 
coverage of the whole campaign was published. According to the avail-
4 According to research conducted by the Levada-Center, young Russians 
(18–24 years old) are the most likely to use the Internet – in 2017 over 90% of them 
went online at least a few times a day. Also, the majority of the age group of 25–39 
(almost 80%) uses the Internet several times a day (Левада-Центр, 2017a).
5 During this peculiar election campaign, in March 2017 the Anti-Corruption 
Foundation led by Navalny published a film titled “He Is Not Dimon to You,” in 
which the detailed results of the investigation into the connections between corruption 
and the concealed estate of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev were presented. The 
film was viewed online by over 27 million people (during the first year, and 12 mil-
lion in the first month). As a result, Medvedev lost public trust, and a large group of 
Russians demanded his resignation. Also, thousands of Russians took part in protests 
organized by Navalny against corruption among the authorities.
6 Only 4 years previously, despite the fact that Navalny was one of the faces of 
the so-called “white revolution” (mass post-election protests of 2012) and succeeded 
in Moscow’s mayor election (placing second and getting almost a third of the votes), 
only 1 in 3 Russians recognized his name (Левада-Центр, 2017b).
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able information, the most commonly chosen amount of donation for Na-
valny was (median) 500 rubles (about 8 dollars), and the average donation 
was 1,500 rubles (about 25 dollars). The opposition candidate’s campaign 
was supported by about 100,000 people. A big part of the collected money 
was allocated to staff payments — a few hundred people were responsible 
for organizing events and rallies, training and coordination of the vol-
unteers, verification and supervision of the campaign. Additionally, the 
maintenance of the network of local groups of staff was funded (premises 
and equipment renting, etc.) and funds for political agitation (online and 
offline) (Финальный	финансовый	отчет). Such extensive reporting of 
income and expenditure was meant to prevent any accusations of fraud 
from political opponents, and also strengthen the image of an honest op-
position candidate who was fighting corruption among the authorities.
Navalny’s election promise
During Navalny’s election preparations, an election manifesto was 
published on his website – a part of the campaign required by the Russian 
law. According to his declarations, the manifesto had been formulated 
based on information gathered during rallies and meetings with the citi-
zens of various cities and towns, and on expert opinions. In “Beautiful 
Russia of the Future” (as the platform was named) Navalny mainly refers 
to the inappropriate use of the country’s wealth – natural resources, quali-
Figure 3. Online shop with Navalny’s campaign merchandise
Source: Навальный20!8, https://2018.navalny.com/, 4.12.2017.
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fied manpower, industry, agriculture and infrastructure, from which the 
profits, for almost two decades, have been going to a chosen few closely 
linked to authority. He called for the resources to be used as a foundation 
for the country’s prosperity. He planned to achieve his goal by increasing 
expenditure on healthcare and education. Additional funding was to be ac-
quired by eliminating corruption and reducing spending on bureaucracy, 
propaganda, armed conflicts, etc. Human capital was to be a foundation of 
the new Russia – especially important were: education, new technologies, 
and innovation. A good, well-funded, high-level education was intended 
to guarantee the development of the country. Navalny also drew attention 
to income inequity (he demanded a raise in the minimum wage, retire-
ment program reform and new taxes, e.g., for using infrastructure built by 
previous generations that was unfairly privatized in the 1990s). Among 
his promises, one can find those regarding strengthening (or more accu-
rately – building) independent local governments and reinforcing regions. 
The main aims of foreign policy were to cooperate with other European 
countries, withdraw from armed conflicts (Syria, Ukraine), and regulate 
visa issues with Central Asian countries (exacerbating the requirements to 
migrant workers) (Программа; Прекрасная).
The manifesto formulated by Navalny and cooperating experts appears 
to contain many tangible solutions to Russia’s main problems – corrup-
tion, underinvested education and healthcare, huge social stratification, 
etc. It does not have big, catchy slogans, and empty heroism. References 
to unity and history, incomprehensible for the majority of voters, weigh-
ing on democracy, freedom and other abstract concepts, were reduced. 
However, the question whether this particular manifesto would interest 
Russians remains unanswered – it requires careful reading and at least 
a basic level of knowledge.
Election boycott and post-election protests
After the Central Electoral Commission’s decision refusing Navalny’s 
registration, the candidate changed his strategy. In place of the electoral 
campaign, an election boycott campaign had started – pursuant to the 
statement that “if an independent candidate is not allowed to run in the 
election, it is not an election at all.” The following objectives were set for 
the coming three months: close observation of the election, monitoring 
election turnout and encouraging others to take part in the boycott. Nav-
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alny announced that he would not recognize the election results nor the 
elected authorities (Объявляем	забастовку).
As part of the boycott, an information campaign was carried out; its 
main slogans were: “An election without competition is not an election” 
and “Election without Navalny, Putin’s main competitor – is a mockery.”7 
At the same time, they tried to convince Russians that if there was no pos-
sibility of choosing between real candidates, it was better not to vote at 
all. Additionally, several larger protests against eliminating Navalny from 
the election took place. For example, the candidate’s supporters protested 
on January 28, 2018 in dozens of Russian cities – among others, Irkutsk, 
Kemerovo, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Moscow and Saint Pe-
tersburg. In total, police arrested more than 350 people in some of these 
cities («Забастовка	избирателей»).
Mass protests were organized also after the election – right before the 
inauguration of Putin’s fourth presidential term. In the protest under the 
slogan “He’s not our tsar” (Russian: Он	нам	не	царь) organized by Nav-
alny in 27 Russian cities “against the actual establishment of a monarchy, 
against corruption, against inequalities, censorship and anarchy” several 
thousand people took part. In some of the cities, authorities permitted 
the protest; however, in the biggest ones – Moscow and Saint Petersburg 
– Navalny’s supporters carried them out without the necessary permis-
sions (which could not be obtained). This explains the huge number of ar-
rests (around 1,600 people), including teenagers and random pedestrians. 
Those detained complained about the police’s extreme brutality: some 
of the people were taken to hospital (Филимонов, 2018; Литой, 2018). 
Navalny himself was also arrested, and, for repeatedly breaching the rules 
of organizing mass events and for disobedience to police, was sentenced 
to 30 days in jail (administrative sanctions) (Лебеденко, 2018). Other 
protesters faced trials and sanctions, too; however, the inauguration of 
Putin’s presidency was not disturbed.
The effects of Navalny’s “non-campaign”
Initially, the main aim of Navalny’s actions was to run in the election 
and gather as many votes as possible. However, after the rejection of his 
7 Russian:	Выборы	без	конкуренции	–	это	не	выборы;	Выборы	без	Навально-
го,	главного	конкурента	Путина	–	это	фарс.
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candidacy during the registration process, the campaign was transformed 
into an election boycott, justified by the fact that there was no real alterna-
tive to the incumbent president. According to the data shared by the staff 
of the opposition candidate, the actual voter turnout (obtained through 
observations by tens of thousands of volunteers) was 2.5 percentage 
points lower than the turnout officially presented by the Central Electoral 
Commission (59.6% vs. 62.%). Also, due to the observer group organized 
by Navalny, it was possible to register many violations and prove that 
more than 10 million votes for Putin were placed in ballot boxes illegally 
(Кампания	Навального	2018).
Navalny’s campaign has proven that political activity based on tangi-
ble arguments is possible in Russia. Instead of grandiose and meaningless 
declarations about patriotism, the Great War, tradition and imaginary en-
emies, Navalny proposed actual solutions to pressing issues – corruption, 
social stratification, politicians’ huge fortunes, widespread poverty, etc. 
All the protests, rallies and events did not aim at conversing about, for 
many, abstract concepts such as democracy, human rights or freedom. 
These events exposed the pathology of authority and looked for solutions 
for the future. Of course, it was not always a pretty substantive discus-
sion, it included many populist elements as well. Nonetheless, it brought 
a new quality to Russian politics.
The campaign on the Internet, social media and on Russian streets 
allowed Navalny to build a large group of people supporting his actions 
and ready to help in his political activity. Firstly, it consists of a group 
of more than 200,000 volunteers who, together with trained specialists, 
coordinated the whole campaign process. Secondly, there are thousands 
of young people who took part in the protests organized by the opposi-
tion candidate during the campaign. Examples include the March 2017 
protests demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
after his hidden fortune and links to corruption were revealed; and the 
protests of January 2018 against banning Navalny from running in the 
presidential election. And, last but not least, the hundreds, thousands and 
even tens of thousands of people who came to the pre-election meetings 
with the opposition candidate, organized in dozens of Russian cities.
Navalny did not, of course, have any chance of winning the presi-
dential election, but his actions seem to have been dictated by long-term 
goals. His aim is to run for president in either 2024 or 2030, and the 
recent campaign was a great opportunity to build his public image and 
prepare to run in a future election as a nationwide candidate, an opinion 
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shared by an expert from the Carnegie analytical center, Andrei Koles-
nikov (Kolesnikov, 2017). The creation of a strong candidate appears to 
be a great strategy for the Russian opposition, especially during the time 
of the super-presidency, where neither Parliament, nor the government 
play an important role in actual governance. If the Russian authorities 
prolong the exclusion of Navalny from the political scene (e.g., through 
long-time jail sentences), and he continues to slowly build his position 
by completing his manifesto with proposals for tangible change, he can 
count on higher support than 1–2% in the next election.
Conclusions
The campaign carried out by Alexei Navalny in 2017 and 2018 un-
doubtedly was only a prelude to the preparations for the next presidential 
election; this time it was mainly informational. It has also proven that in 
Russian public life there is a demand – although still low – for a different 
style of politics. Direct meetings with voters, real conversations about 
problems, tangible solutions and demands are the main characteristics of 
this campaign, as are anti-government protests, which attracted thousands 
of people, hundreds of volunteers and millions of rubles donated by Rus-
sians to the campaign. As a result, the recognition of Navalny has risen, 
if only slightly. He also gained necessary experience before his next elec-
tion campaign.
Just after Putin’s fourth electoral victory, his opposition competitor 
can now count on the support of 1–2% of Russians. Despite the fact that 
he accurately identifies major issues which affect Russians, and his anti-
corruption actions could be appealing to millions of voters from smaller 
towns and cities, Navalny has one main problem – he does not exist on 
television (he only appears there in a negative context, as a defendant or 
leader of another riot). Television is the main medium from which the 
majority of Russians acquire information (over 80%). Hence, it will be 
extremely difficult to translate the support from protests and rallies to 
actual votes.
In mid-May another founding congress of Navalny’s new party, Rus-
sia of the Future, took place. Its aim is to make tangible changes and 
reforms in Russia. It will surely provide great support for the opposition 
candidate in the coming years. However, in the battle for power, given 
the specificity of the Russian political system (strong personalization, the 
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majority of actual power concentrated in the hands of the President), he 
must focus mainly on building his individual position and try to reach the 
so-called television Russia. At the same time, it is unlikely the Russian 
authorities will allow the uncontrolled increase of his popularity.
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„Nie/kampania nie/istniejącego kandydata” 
– Aleksiej Nawalny w wyborach prezydenckich w Rosji w 2018 r. 
 
Streszczenie
W marcu 2018 r. w Federacji Rosyjskiej odbyły się kolejne wybory prezydenckie. 
Elekcję po raz czwarty, zdecydowaną większością głosów, wygrał Władimir Putin. 
Do udziału w rywalizacji na urząd prezydenta nie został dopuszczony Aleksiej Na-
walny – opozycjonista, który swoją kampanię wyborczą przygotowywał od końca 
2016 r. Pomimo eliminacji z procesu wyborczego, A. Nawalny pozostał aktywnym 
uczestnikiem życia politycznego Rosji przed i po wyborach, przeprowadził także ak-
cję bojkotu wyborów oraz zorganizował powyborcze protesty. Nie ulega wątpliwości, 
iż pomimo zakazu udziału w elekcji, A. Nawalny był jedną z kluczowych postaci pro-
cesu wyborczego. Dlatego też, celem artykułu jest pogłębiona analiza przygotowań 
do kampanii A. Nawalnego – autorzy skupili się nie tylko na opozycyjnej działalności 
kandydata, ale również na unikalnych środkach i metodach prowadzenia przez niego 
kampanii (internet, media społecznościowe, crowdfunding). W ramach artykułu omó-
wione zostały nie tylko przygotowania do kampanii, ale również przyczyny odmowy 
rejestracji A. Nawalnego jako kandydata, wskaźniki społecznego poparcia, relacje 
z innymi kandydatami oraz zmiana strategii po decyzji komisji wyborczej. Analiza 
powstała w oparciu o badania nad aktami rosyjskiego prawa, decyzjami centralnej 
komisji wyborczej, wynikami badań opinii publicznej oraz przekazami w rosyjskich 
i międzynarodowych mediach.
 
Słowa kluczowe: wybory w Rosji, Prezydent Rosji, A. Nawalny, kampania wybor-
cza, opozycja polityczna
